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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for cargo theft
14 results foundAuthor: Europol Title: Cargo Theft Report: Applying the Brakes to Road Cargo Crime in Europe Summary: This report has been produced by a Europol working group, established to look at the issues related to cargo/freight crime on a European level. It consisted of police representatives from several EU Member States and also members of TAPA. This police/industry partnership acknowledged the need to work collaboratively in this area, share information and intelligence, in order to combat an area of crime of mutual concern. The aims and objectives of the report are as follows: To agree on a common definition of cargo crime and standard terminology; To promote awareness of the issues across EU Member States law enforcement agencies; To give an insight into current modi operandi (MOs); To give an insight into the different approaches adopted by MS; and To develop guidelines for both prevention and investigation for this type of crime. Details: The Hague: EUROPOL, 2009. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 23, 2010 at: http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Serious_Crime_Overviews/Cargo_Theft_Report.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Serious_Crime_Overviews/Cargo_Theft_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 120629 Keywords: Cargo TheftFreight IndustryStolen GoodsStolen PropertyTheft from Motor Vehicles |
Author: International Road Transport Union Title: Attacks on Drivers of International Heavy Goods Vehicles; Survey Results Summary: Since the tragic events in the United States on 11th September 2001, it has been increasingly recognised that all transport modes are at risk from terrorism and crime. Those involved in road freight transport also face a number of specific challenges, which include theft of goods and vehicles, attacks on truck drivers, illegal immigration, special risks related to the movement of dangerous goods by road, as well as smuggling. In addition to these often crime-related challenges, authorities and operators must remain vigilant to possible terrorist use or targeting of vehicles and infrastructure. These challenges – and their responses – pose serious daily problems for all actors involved in this sector: the drivers, transport companies, police / law enforcement agencies, authorities, politicians, trade associations, unions, insurers, truckstop operators and other players. Road freight transport, a vital element of international production schemes, trade and economic relations across frontiers in Europe and elsewhere, faces this challenge of enhanced security requirements against the background of a highly competitive road freight market. The number of vehicle thefts and freight robbery incidents appear to be increasing in many countries. The need to protect drivers, their vehicles and the freight carried is now becoming an issue of increasing concern. It can however be noted with satisfaction that measures of protection and prevention have already proved efficient in a few countries. Indeed, much work has already been done to address many of the multiple threats faced by the European transport sector. One type of threat in particular, attacks on international HGV drivers, has consistently been cited as a significant problem. To date, however, information needed to better understand the nature and scale of the problem and its consequences on transport drivers, companies and the sector as a whole has been lacking and only anecdotal evidence of attacks on drivers has been available. The apparent reasons for this are varied: drivers frequently do not inform the police of the attacks for multiple reasons such as language difficulty and lack of trust in authorities and insufficient information about where and to whom the attacks should be reported. When they are reported, these incidents are very often not centrally recorded or properly responded to. Indeed in many countries a comprehensive policy and decision-making framework at local and national level is not yet in place to countervail spreading crime on the roads. The most effective measures to fight crime, such as for example, a wider use of protective devices on board vehicles, providing sufficient secure truck parking areas, setting up efficient and accessible incident reporting and recording structures, implementing intra-company preventive and protective security measures, raising awareness, improving training and so on, are, in most countries, not or hardly implemented. Details: Geneva: IRU, 2008. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 11, 2011 at: http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/IntOrg/ecmt/crime/pdf/08AttackSurvey.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/IntOrg/ecmt/crime/pdf/08AttackSurvey.pdf Shelf Number: 121712 Keywords: AssaultsCargo TheftFreight IndustryStolen GoodsStolen PropertyTransport SecurityVehicle TheftWorkplace Crime |
Author: Ekwall, Daniel Title: Managing the Risk for Antagonistic Threats against the Transport Network Summary: The World Trade Centre terror attack in 2001 changed the world and with it the conditions for logistics worldwide. The aftermath of the attack brought needed attention to the vulnerability of modern supply chains. This thesis addresses the antagonistic threats that exploit the vulnerability in a supply chain. Antagonistic threats are a limited array of risks and uncertainties and can be addressed with risk management tools and strategies. There are three key demarcations between antagonistic threats and other risks and uncertainties: deliberate (caused), illegal (defined by law), and hostile (negative impact, in this thesis, for transport network activities). This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the usage of theories from criminology in supply chain risk management to handle antagonistic threats against the transport network. The recognition that antagonistic threats toward the transport network are a problem leads to verification of the research questions from the background and the theoretical framework. This is done to place or relate the research questions closer to the context. Furthermore, it leads to the conclusion that the answers may or may not contain competing and/or incompatible parts which differ depending on the perspective or viewpoint at the moment. One of the most important things to understand is that antagonistic threats toward freight always have been a feature in both business and politics. The different functions and goals for all stakeholders mean that all stakeholders and actors may use similar methods to manage antagonistic threats but the effects and consequences will change according to the circumstances. The system approach in this thesis is a soft-system thinking where reality is described in subjective terms and the whole system has the distinctive trait of vague or undefined boundaries between system components and the surrounding environment. Therefore, this thesis uses a complex system approach in which paradoxes and bounded rationality describes the system’s behaviour. This thesis defines the legal descriptions and criminal threats against and within supply chain management activities that entail both the systems context and boundaries. Managing of the antagonistic threats through the risk management perspective is separated into two sides, pre-event and post-event measures, which means the system needs to be robust and resilient, using logistics terms. It should be robust to automatically handle small risks (normally with high likelihood and low impact). The system also needs resilience in order to adapt, improvise, and overcome any disturbance greater than the system’s robustness can handle. Both robustness and its resilience can constitute of the full range of prevention, mitigation, and transferring tools and methods. Regardless of which perspective or viewpoint is chosen for analysing the problem, the same basic set of tools and methods are valid, but in practical use they need to be adapted to the actors’ needs and wants for managing their exposure to antagonistic threats. Details: Göteborg : Chalmers University of Technology, 2009. 286p. Source: Internet Resource: Doctoral Thesis: Accessed May 11, 2011 at: http://bada.hb.se/handle/2320/5033 Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://bada.hb.se/handle/2320/5033 Shelf Number: 121713 Keywords: Cargo TheftFreightRisk ManagementSupply Chain SecurityTransport Security |
Author: Ozberk, Bahattin Can Title: Mapping the Flow of Theft Endangered Goods in EU Summary: Every country in world has opportunities for different type of productions and this leads compensation. According to this, International Trade has become very important in all countries worldwide for ages; it helps the developing of the country and contributes more convenient area for the citizens. It is because nations have to live with trading. In this manner, many agreements are signed to get efficient merchandising because international trade contains many risks like intervention, political, non-acceptance, credit, war and also uncontrollable events. European Union can be considered as an agreement since its fundamental principal is free movement of people and goods. Increasing of movement of these goods around the European Union is seen as “easy pickings” by crime groups and nowadays society is facing with this criminal behavior. That motivation causes many problems for supply chain and logistics. Transportation systems are being tried to adjust as more secured while opportunity to thefts attacks to goods are rising. The complexity of this problem is tried to be solved by good reporting of incidents, pointing out the hot spots or the hot products which are related to EU. It is obvious that there is lack of good reporting or coordinating. According to this thesis a lot of work can be done in order to get brief look for the theft endangered goods which are on road and dangerous zones for theft attacks at EU. This thesis will map out specific countries, cities and positions that are particularly exposed to theft attacks. (For example, Schiphol Airport is chosen as the hottest spot and its hottest products are electronic and music devices while many reports and statistical works are being observed.) Details: Boras, Sweden: University of Boras, School of Engineering, 2010. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Essay: Accessed May 11, 2011 at: http://bada.hb.se/bitstream/2320/6566/1/Can%20%C3%96zberk.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://bada.hb.se/bitstream/2320/6566/1/Can%20%C3%96zberk.pdf Shelf Number: 121591 Keywords: Cargo TheftHot ProductsStolen GoodsSupply Chain |
Author: Engel, A.W. van den Title: Organised Theft of Commercial Vehicles and their Loads in the European Union Summary: This study analyses the problems, developments and implications of organised theft of commercial vehicles and their loads in the EU. It gives an overview of the volume, nature and yearly damage of this form of organised theft. Furthermore, it analyses how the problem is tackled in the Member States and on the EU level. The final chapter contains recommendations on how European and national policy should deal with organised theft in the road transport sector in the future. Details: Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, Policy Department Structural and Cohension Policies, 2007. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2011 at: http://www.setpos.eu/docs/organised%20theft%20of%20commercial%20vehicles%20and%20their%20loads%20in%20the%20EU%20july%202007%20EN.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Europe URL: http://www.setpos.eu/docs/organised%20theft%20of%20commercial%20vehicles%20and%20their%20loads%20in%20the%20EU%20july%202007%20EN.pdf Shelf Number: 122017 Keywords: Cargo TheftFreight IndustryStolen GoodsStolen PropertyTheft (Europe)Transport IndustryTransport TheftTransportation Security |
Author: Rountree, Carla D. Title: Development of Counter Measures to Security Risks from Air Cargo Transport Summary: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 displayed the shortcomings of aviation security in the United States. Most of the attention on aviation security since that time has focused on airline passengers, their luggage, and their carry-on items, leaving air cargo security on the back burner. The lack of security screening and screening guidelines of cargo traveling by both passenger and all-cargo aircraft is the driving purpose behind this research project: the development of a framework that may be used by individual airports or airlines to analyze various security setups for screening outbound air cargo within an on-airport cargo facility. This was accomplished through airport surveys, a case study at an air cargo facility, and computer simulations testing various setups of security technologies to screen cargo within a facility. Data collected from surveys sent to over 100 of the nation’s major airports revealed the lack of security in the air cargo environment and validated the need for this research. Information was obtained on security measures utilized for cargo and personnel, as well as the frequency of cargo screenings and information on the size and setups of cargo facilities. Also, a results comparison between large and small airports was conducted. A case study was performed at a cargo facility within a major U.S. airport in order to gather data pertinent to the simulations used to test the security setups. Information gathered on truck arrivals, the number of flight destinations, security measures in place, as well as the general facility setup was used to form the basis of the simulations. The simulations, conducted in Arena 7.01, tested the effectiveness and cargo throughput of four security cases. Each case employed a different combination of security measures proven suitable for an air cargo environment. The security setups were evaluated based on the security systems’ costs, the overall effectiveness of catching highrisk cargo, and the average amount of time taken to process cargo through the facility. The Arena simulations present airlines, freight forwarders, and airport authorities with the necessary tool to evaluate various cargo security screening measures that will provide the best security solution for their particular facility or facilities. However, further research is needed on the effectiveness of many security technologies. With this information, government and aviation officials will be able to use this framework as a step toward achieving a well-rounded plan for ensuring the safety and security of our nation’s air cargo. Details: Charlottesville, VA: Center for Transportation Studies, University of Virginia, 2004. 142p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report No. UVACTS-5-14-63: Accessed October 6, 2011 at: http://cts.virginia.edu/docs/UVACTS-5-14-63.pdf Year: 2004 Country: United States URL: http://cts.virginia.edu/docs/UVACTS-5-14-63.pdf Shelf Number: 122994 Keywords: Air Cargo SecurityAirplanesCargo TheftContainer SecurityTerrorism, Cargo Containers |
Author: Szelp, Attila Title: Cargo Security Initiatives in the EU and the USA, their Impact on Business Operations and Mutual Recognition with Focus on AEO and C-TPAT Summary: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a tremendous impact on international trade policy. The USA was the first country to introduce cargo security and facilitation measures as a counteraction. The EU and international organizations also established new security programs in order to better secure cargo movements across borders. This thesis gives an overview of security initiatives introduced by international organizations, the EU and the USA, with an emphasis on the trade facilitation programs Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) and Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and a comparison of them. The process towards mutual recognition of these programs is then described. Three case studies put the topic under the microscope: The perception as well as actual benefits and disadvantages from economic actors' points of view are presented and implementation and operational processes in companies are demonstrated. The case studies include port authorities, carriers and logistics providers. Finally, the author reflects on his findings. Details: Vienna: WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institut für Transportwirtschaft und Logistik, 2010. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 21, 2011 at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/3013/1/Szelp.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://epub.wu.ac.at/3013/1/Szelp.pdf Shelf Number: 123074 Keywords: Cargo SecurityCargo TheftMaritime SecurityStolen GoodsStolen PropertyTerrorism |
Author: Veiter, Daniela Title: Cargo Security Initiatives in the United States, Canada and Mexico and their Effect on Trade in the NAFTA Region Summary: Cross-border trade today is an essential driver of nations’ prosperity. A prolonged disruption in a supply chain has an enormous impact on a country’s as well as the global economy. The international transportation network and its long supply chains are very fragile and vulnerable to terrorist abuse or similar attacks. The high number of agents add another level of risk. The products, factories, supply chain facilities and supply chain partners, carriers, people and information could all present danger to the supply chain. Globalization turned the market place into a competitive environment where companies seek to hire the most affordable workers as well as choose the cheapest suppliers or service providers. This trend spreads business practices out all over the world and increases the need for transportation while adding complexity to a company’s value chain. The most effective way is a worldwide cooperation of countries on securing the global trade system without hindering the trade flow. A global partnership involving all agents along a supply chain with harmonised and compatible systems, both for customs work and for the exchange of information would be the perfect solution. And collaboration and coordinated work reduces the risk of disruptions and is more cost-effective too. Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington DC, the international trade community has dedicated more time and money on the issue of security. The U.S. government, the Canadian government and the Mexican government have established a multi-layered defense strategy to protect their people and country. International cargo that is being shipped to certain target countries poses a significant security risk. In particular, cargo containers can be abused to carry weapons, in particular weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other dangerous items. Those containers are particularly vulnerable to changes from their legitimate commercial purpose due to the numerous transfers within the transport chain they are subject to. Those very same internationally moving containers, though, are of utter importance to global commerce as they ship about 95% of the world’s international cargo, in terms of value. Over 48 million containers are being shipped between seaports around the world. Intermodal transport has enabled trucks and trains to move goods around continents in the ocean containers. Any terrorist actions can have largescale damage to a country’s society and economy and thus it is essential to have systems in place that can prevent such events from happening beforehand. The United States of America was the first country to start introducing plans to identify high risk cargo shipments and soon Canada and Mexico followed. The initiatives seek to ensure security over different levels. There are three main areas of risk that these security initiatives seek to address. First, the security of vital cargo information relating to the contents and destination of the shipment must be accessible by customs authorities. This also includes IT security. Then there is the level of physical control through inspections and screening. The last level covers the entire supply chain through screening and background checks of every agent involved in the process. This includes all groups between the manufacturer and the final destination of the product. This thesis talks about cargo security initiatives in the NAFTA countries of the United States, Canada and Mexico for any shipments crossing borders between those countries by either road, sea, air or rail. It shows the development and intensification of those security regulations over the last years, analyses their purpose and recommends how to best deal with them if you are a business located in this area. Details: Vienna: Institut für Transportwirtschaft und Logistik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2009. 133p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: http://epub.wu.ac.at/822/1/document.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://epub.wu.ac.at/822/1/document.pdf Shelf Number: 123240 Keywords: Cargo Security (U.S., Canada, Mexico)Cargo TheftMaritime CrimeStolen GoodsStolen PropertySupply ChainsTerrorism |
Author: Brentz, Brooks Title: Learning from Recent Threats to Cargo Security Summary: On October 29, 2010, President Barack Obama confirmed that suspicious air cargo shipments destined for the United States contained explosive materials. Although these shipments were discovered in Dubai and England, the United States federal government grounded planes at Newark and Philadelphia airports to inspect packages based on fears of a terrorist threat originating from Yemen. Intervention prompted by intelligence sharing among governments of the countries involved prevented catastrophic outcomes. As with other near misses, governments are responding by reexamining cargo transport regulations and security practices. Accenture believes that it is time for manufacturer-shippers to do the same to protect against major disruptions to their global supply chains. However, given the vast volume of goods moving around the world and the multiple modes of transportation involved, practical approaches are needed to address the risks. Details: Boston(?): Accenture, 2011. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2012 at: http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture_Learning_From_Recent_Threats.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture_Learning_From_Recent_Threats.pdf Shelf Number: 124039 Keywords: Cargo SecurityCargo TheftRisk AssessmentStolen GoodsSupply ChainsTheft of Property |
Author: FreightWatch International Title: 2013 Global Cargo Theft Threat Assessment Summary: Global cargo theft risks as shown on the above map vary greatly from country to country. Even within individual countries, risks can vary from region to region. On a country-by-country basis, cargo theft threats, as most other criminal activity, are typically rooted in social, economic and cultural conditions. The prevention of cargo theft on a global scale requires intimate knowledge of incident trends on a regional basis, as security programs and mitigation techniques do not always transfer successfully from region to region. Organizations must diligently gather intelligence and adapt their anti-theft programs to address local threats. The purpose of this report is to outline the risk of cargo theft on a global level, highlighting significant countries in the global supply chain in order to assist industry decision-makers in determining their supply chain security needs. According to data collected by FreightWatch International from numerous sources across the globe, including but not limited to FreightWatch International's own databases, its customers, law enforcement agencies, industry organizations, insurance industry sources and news reports, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, the United States and Russia are the countries most at risk for cargo theft globally. Unless otherwise noted in this assessment report, when specific theft statistics are noted in this assessment report those statistics are derived from FreightWatch International's own data based on cargo security services provided by FreightWatch International to its customers. As such, total theft figures for a particular country or region are likely higher than stated. Please note that this assessment report expresses the opinions of FreightWatch International based on the specific data reviewed. Global cargo theft circumstances and risks can and do change, sometimes frequently and/or quickly, and in ways that may make the facts and opinions expressed in this assessment report no longer complete or valid. As such, the extent to which you rely on the facts and opinions expressed in this assessment should be made entirely by you, in your sole discretion, only after careful analysis of all relevant facts applicable to your business. Details: Austin, TX: FreightWatch International, 2013. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2014 at: http://www.freightwatchintl.com/sites/default/files/attachments/FreightWatch%202013%20Global%20Cargo%20Theft%20Threat%20Assesment%20Full_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.freightwatchintl.com/sites/default/files/attachments/FreightWatch%202013%20Global%20Cargo%20Theft%20Threat%20Assesment%20Full_0.pdf Shelf Number: 133313 Keywords: Cargo TheftCrimes Against BusinessesFreight IndustryStolen Property |
Author: Dugato, Marco Title: Maritime Piracy Worldwide Summary: The phenomenon of maritime piracy dates back to the beginning of seafaring. Since the 1980s, maritime piracy has re-emerged as an international problem because of a significant rise in the recorded attacks. The security of maritime routes is a matter of concern for national governments, ship owners and trade companies whose vessels face the risk of being robbed of their cargo or hijacked for a ransom. Maritime piracy is a complex phenomenon that, according to the definition used, comprises different criminal behaviours (e.g., theft, robbery, kidnapping), modus operandi (e.g., massive armed attacks, insiders, use of skiffs and mother ships) and targets (e.g., the goods carried on the ship, the belongings of the crew, the ship itself). These features may change over time and over space. Looking at the evolution and peculiarities of this phenomenon in different areas can help to identify regularities and implement more effective countermeasures. In recent years, Transcrime has been active in promoting the idea that actual reductions of complex crime phenomena can be reached through specific prevention strategies. This approach relies on accurate analyses of the available data to identify regular patterns and risk factors. This study summarises some of the findings that emerged from the research Transcrime conducted on maritime piracy, using a comparative approach. Details: Trento: Transcrime - Universita degli Studi di Trento, 2015. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Transcrime Research in Brief no. 1: Accessed march 16, 2015 at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/maritime-piracy.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/maritime-piracy.pdf Shelf Number: 134932 Keywords: Cargo TheftMaritime Crime (International:Piracy/PiratesShipping IndustryStolen PropertyTheft of Goods |
Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Title: Transnational Organized Crime and the Impact on the Private Sector: The Hidden Battalions Summary: his paper is based on a detailed review of the scale and nature of organised crime's infiltration of the private sector. These findings are a 'call to arms' for the international private and public sectors to transform their co-operation and teamwork. We have adopted a practical definition of organized crime as that which is carried out by a group of people, suspected of serious criminal offences, over a prolonged period, motivated by profit or power. In our analysis of six major private sector industries, six specific forms of organised crime stood out as either having material impact on the private sector, or using the private sector as facilitators. Money laundering is the process of making dirty money look clean. One estimate puts it at 2% of global GDP - c.$1.5 trillion. Money-laundering is an 'enabling crime', facilitating organized crime (as well as terrorism) with social and economic costs. Asset misappropriation refers to stealing from businesses. For example, cargo thefts cost as much as $30 billion in losses each year worldwide. Counterfeiting and contraband, whilst thought of as being a consumer goods crime, is rife in a broad range of sectors, in particular technology products and pharmaceuticals, to devastating effect. It is estimated by OECD at $461billion, or 2.5% of world trade. Fraud and extortion remain strongly present in the financial, construction and real estate industries. In construction extortion could account for of 20-30 per cent of lost project value. Human trafficking. High volume, low skilled labour enterprises such as construction and building, have the highest penetration of trafficking incidence in the private sector. Cyber Crime. Hacking attacks cost the average American firm $15.4 million per year over. In 2015 68,000 URLs containing child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA) images were hosted online on 1,991 domains. The reputational impact means major tech companies apply significant collaborative resources to weeding out criminal, terrorist and CSEA activity. Finding#1: The Scale and Impact of Crime in the Private Sector is Truly Staggering. A conservative estimate of the value of organized crime was $3.6-$4.8 trillion, in 2015/2016, 7% of global GDP. The broader impact of organized crime is difficult to assess as it is multi-dimensional, and shared across the private, public sector, and society itself. The impact on the private sector only - in terms of revenue loss - is estimated at c$130 billion. The Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP) calculated the financial cost of terrorism at over $52 billion in 2014. A conservative estimate of total transnational organized crime is $870 billion a year. This is more than six times the amount of official development assistance and close to 7% of the world's exports of merchandise Finding #2 Private sectors are either facilitators or targets. Crimes are either done 'to' private sector organisations, or 'through' them. Sectors are either the targets of fraud or asset theft themselves, particularly in construction, consumer goods ($460 billion counterfeit goods), and financial card fraud, or they facilitate crime unwittingly, through use of technology networks by fraudsters to target victims, e.g. the real estate sector laundering dirty funds or the transport industry moving illicit goods. Regulation varies between the 'victim' and 'enabling' industries. Laws are in place to criminalise the use of the private sector for technology or money laundering crime. The victim industries, however, often are reliant on existing laws around theft, or copyright infringement, which are not tailored to the activities of TOC groups and tend to have lower penalties for infringement. Finding #3 Organized crime's impact on the private sector is growing not shrinking. Counterfeit goods have risen from $250 billion to $461 billion in the last 8 years. Asset theft in the transport and logistics theft rose by over 90% 2015 to 2016. There is a sense that regulation is not working: money laundering seizures equated to 0.2% of all laundered funds in one study; and after the dark web's Silk Road was taken down, many sites sprung up to take on and indeed grow the trade. Finding #4 Direct impact of Crime Disproportionately felt in the global south. Sweatshops flourish in South Asia; trafficking of labour and sex workers originates predominantly in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe; corruption in natural resources damages production in Africa and the Caucasus; technology fraud is driven from eastern and southern Europe, West Africa and the Middle East. Whereas in developed economies counterfeit drugs may comprise less than 0.2 percent of the market developing markets are often beset by 30% fakes, as a UNODC report showed for anti-malarial drugs in Africa. Globalization is increasing the 'attack surface' for TOC groups. The abuse of the often weaker regulatory regimes in the Global South by TOC groups further increases the risk for the private sector operating in these areas. Finding #5 Responses re confrontational rather than collaborative. There are very few examples of successful public and private sector co-operation against TOC groups. Private sector organisations complain that communication with the law enforcement sector is one-way and that the regulatory reporting burden, designed to combat crime, can act as a deterrent to co-operation. Tangible results have been seen when industries take the lead on disrupting the work of TOC groups, such as TAPA the Transported Asset Protection Association Details: Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative, 2017. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed December 7, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/gitoc_tocprivatesector_web-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/gitoc_tocprivatesector_web-1.pdf Shelf Number: 148755 Keywords: Cargo TheftContrabandCounterfeit GoodsCybercrimeExtortionHuman TraffickingIllicit TradeMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimePrivate SectorStolen PropertyTheft of Goods |
Author: Ekwall, Daniel Title: Value and incident categories for cargo theft in Europe: Analysing TAPA EMEA statistics Summary: Purpose of this paper To analysis the relationship between value (reported stolen value) and different incident categories in order to find patterns and trends in cargo theft within Europe. Design/methodology/approach The research is explorative as this type of research is missing in logistics but also deductive as it utilizes theories from criminology. The analysis is based on TAPA EMEA's IIS transport related crime database. The result is analyzed and discussed within a frame of reference consisting of theories from logistics and criminology. Findings There are seasonal variations of incident categories. This variation is found both between months of the year and the day of the week for many of the incident categories, but the patterns are different for different incident categories. Within this understanding there are many changes in hot spots, modus operandi, theft endangered objects and handling methods during time, but the basic theoretical frame of reference is still more or less the same. Research limitations/implications The research is based on theories deduced from criminology and logistics together with secondary data regarding cargo theft. The geographically limitation to the Europe is done of practical reasons whiles the frame of reference can be used globally for analysis antagonistic threats against transports. Practical implications This research is limited by the content and classification within the TAPA EMEA IIS database. Nevertheless, this database is the best available database and the reports comes mainly from the industry itself, represented by the different TAPA members how report their losses anonymous, nevertheless the quality of the data limits the possibility to make normative statements about cargo theft prevention. What is original/value of paper This paper is the first within supply chain risk management that utilizes actual crime statistics reported by the industry itself, in order to analyze the occurrence of cargo theft by focusing on the value of the stolen vehicle/goods in relation with incident categories. Details: Conference paper, 2012. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2018 at: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:887489/FULLTEXT01.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:887489/FULLTEXT01.pdf Shelf Number: 150871 Keywords: Cargo TheftFreight IndustryRisk ManagementStolen GoodsStolen PropertySupply Chain SecurityTheft of GoodsTransport Security |
Author: Ekwall, Daniel Title: Theft of Goods in Ports: A review of TAPA EMEA IIS statistics Summary: This report examines patterns of reported cargo thefts at maritime transport facilities in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) with respect to frequency, incident category, modus operandi, and targeted product category. The analysis is based on data obtained from the Incident Information Service (IIS), a database of transport-related crimes from the Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) in the EMEA region. The results are analysed and discussed within a frame of reference based on supply chain risk management and criminology theories. We find that maritime transport facilities constitute a rare target location for cargo thieves, as only 102 of more than 24,500 incidents (0.4%) in the IIS database occur there. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be made. First, there seems to be seasonality in day of the week, but probably not in month of the year. Second, violent and fraudulent modi operandi of theft at maritime transport facilities are about as common as in the whole data set. Thus, it could be conjectured that the impact from violent and fraudulent incidents is several times higher than the most common types of incident category or modus operandi, although this is unsupported in this study. The product categories signal that there is big variation in value in stolen goods. Third, it is possible that potential perpetrators consider security levels at maritime transport facilities to be higher, leading to fewer theft attempts. This study is limited by the content of and classifications within the TAPA EMEA IIS database. Details: Turku, Finland: HAZARD Project, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, 2018. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Publications of the Hazard Project, 18:2018: Accessed November 27, 2018 at: http://www.utu.fi/en/sites/hazard/publications/Documents/HAZARD%20Publication%2018%20Theft%20of%20Goods%20in%20Ports.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://www.utu.fi/en/sites/hazard/publications/Documents/HAZARD%20Publication%2018%20Theft%20of%20Goods%20in%20Ports.pdf Shelf Number: 153852 Keywords: Cargo SecurityCargo TheftHot ProductsMaritime CrimePort SecurityStolen GoodsTheft of Goods |